New Zealand experienced its largest waterborne disease outbreak in modern history in August 2016 with 5,500 cases and four fatalities. This recent outbreak is one of 24 drinking-waterborne disease outbreaks in affluent nations that have been reported in the scientific literature since the infamous Walkerton, Ontario, Canada fatal outbreak (2,300 cases, seven fatalities) in May 2000. These disasters were all eminently preventable given the economic and intellectual resources existing in the countries where they occurred. These outbreaks are analysed according to major recurring themes, including: complacency, naiveté and ignorance, failure to learn from experience and chemophobia.
INTRODUCTION Surprisingly, despite having the economic and knowledge resources to eliminate them, drinking-waterborne disease outbreaks in developed countries keep occurring (Hrudey & Hrudey , ) . Public health risk can never be managed to zero, particularly when there is a substantial human element involved in causation. However, a review and analysis of the occurrence and causes of drinking-waterborne disease outbreaks in developed countries reveals a depressing contribution and role for ignorance and complacency, even among supposedly trained and knowledgeable practitioners. The observed ignorance and complacency is difficult to reconcile with the readily available evidence that should enable the concerned practitioners to avoid such disasters. This review summarizes common causal themes from 24 drinking-waterborne disease outbreaks in affluent nations since the infamous fatal outbreak in Walkerton, Canada, in May 2000.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In this paper, the discussion has been developed from an analysis of the circumstances and factors contributing to drinking-waterborne disease outbreaks in jurisdictions 2004, 2014 which had the resources, both economic and technical, to avoid such public health disasters. A comprehensive data base of published reports of drinkingwaterborne disease outbreaks in developed countries was created and maintained. The data base was initiated by collecting English language publications in the peer-reviewed scientific literature from fields including epidemiology, public health, water quality and environmental engineering.
The collected publications were supplemented by official investigation reports and documented public inquiries produced in whatever local language they were accessible (Hrudey & Hrudey ) .
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The 24 outbreaks occurring since 2000 and their salient features are summarized in Table 1 . Only salient details of each outbreak are provided. However, details in support of the themes that are discussed below are evident in the references cited for each outbreak in Table 1 .
Major recurring themes contributing to failure
The scope of commentary on the highlighted outbreaks is intentionally concise, but a more expansive explanation and documentation of the themes summarized below can be accessed online at Hrudey (). The publication (Hrudey ) was evidence prepared for and used by the New Zealand Government Inquiry into Havelock North Drinking Water (Government of New Zealand ). The facts reported in the peer-reviewed literature for each outbreak are inherently limited unless they have also been subjected to an independent inquiry or an investigation, either of which has published an accessible report in any language. For the outbreaks listed in Table 1, Table 1 includes one or more literature citations that provide additional details about the circumstances associated with each outbreak.
Complacency, naiveté and ignorance
The overwhelming message that arises when reviewing the details of drinking-waterborne disease outbreaks in affluent countries is how eminently preventable they all were. With and must be regarded as a public-health threat to any drinking-water supply.
Today, we have progressed well past our knowledge of a few decades ago when science had not yet characterized previously unrecognized threats to safe drinking water, like Cryptosporidium oocysts. New pathogens will inevitably be discovered in the future, but the reality is that all microbial pathogens are microscopic particles that must pass through drinking-water systems in a viable state such that they can reproduce in a susceptible host and cause illness. These realities mean that water treatment that achieves effective fine-particle removal and disinfection that inactivates any pathogens not removed will prevent drinking-water disease outbreaks regardless of the genetic make-up of the pathogen. 
Failure to learn from experience
Considering the recurring failures that are evident in the 24 outbreaks cited in this paper and summarized in Table 1, water purveyors are not universally learning from experience with failure. The lessons that need to be learned are not that complex, so we can only conclude there is a systematic failure to communicate these rather basic lessons to all those individuals who are responsible for providing safe drinking water for the public. We cannot imagine that such individuals would knowingly wish to make their consuming public ill. A more likely explanation is that such individuals have not been adequately trained to recognize and to avoid conditions that will allow such eminently preventable drinking-waterborne outbreaks from happening.
To that end, we all have a responsibility to communicate Conceptually, the water safety plan approach is much superior to a narrow focus strictly on numerical water-quality criteria for preventing the factors contributing to the outbreak failures documented in Table 1 The identified causes suggest a need for an expanded commitment to informing operational personnel, managers and regulators about the authentic negative experience in such outbreaks.
Adoption of a water-safety plan approach offers an opportunity to prevent waterborne disease outbreaks. However, the fact that two of the water utilities that experienced outbreaks had water-safety plans indicates that the quality of
